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The interplay of social and strategic motivations in human interactions is a largely unexplored
question in collective social phenomena. Whether individuals’ decisions are taken in a pure strategic
basis or due to social pressure without a rational background crucially influences the model outcome.
Here we study a networked Prisoner’s Dilemma in which decisions are made either based on the
replication of the most successful neighbor’s strategy (unconditional imitation) or by pure social
imitation following an update rule inspired by the voter model. The main effects of the voter
dynamics are an enhancement of the final consensus, i.e., asymptotic states are generally uniform,
and a promotion of cooperation in certain regions of the parameter space as compared to the
outcome of purely strategic updates. Thus, voter dynamics acts as an interface noise and has
a similar effect to a pure random noise; furthermore, its influence is mostly independent of the
network heterogeneity. When strategic decisions are made following other update rules such as the
replicator or Moran processes, the dynamic mixed state found under unconditional imitation for
some parameters disappears, but an increase of cooperation in certain parameter regions is still
observed. Comparing our results with recent experiments on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we conclude
that such a mixed dynamics may explain moody conditional cooperation among the agents.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
Keywords: complex systems, evolutionary game theory, prisoner’s dilemma, voter model, cooperation, con-
sensus
I. INTRODUCTION
Collective social phenomena arise from interactions of
individuals, considered the elementary units of social
structures [1]. Related phenomena include, e.g., strategic
interactions, opinion/cultural dynamics, epidemic and
rumor spreading, and so on. In many of these problems,
dynamics is not uniquely defined as in a Hamiltonian
system, and it is often the case that social contexts can
evolve in time in many different manners [2]. This is
particularly relevant in strategic interactions, in which
people take into account their expectations about what
their partners might choose to do [3, 4].
A specific and socially important problem where the
dynamics leads to very different outcomes is the emer-
gence of cooperation [5–8]. Indeed, the spreading and
prosperity of cooperative behaviors, often observed in
human societies despite their disadvantage in terms of
fitness of single individuals, has been for years a cen-
tral topic in Evolutionary Dynamics, Economics, Soci-
ology and Psychology. Several models, mechanisms and
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ideas have been suggested in order to explain the emer-
gence and the stability of cooperation [9–11], particularly
in games where cooperation is costly such as Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD). One such mechanism is the so-called net-
work reciprocity, which was first proposed by Nowak and
May [12]. They showed that if the PD is played on a lat-
tice frozen configurations can appear, where cooperators
have survived and even overwhelmed defectors. Subse-
quent research established that the effect of the topology
is not universal [13] (see also [14] for a recent review),
and the enhancement of the cooperative strategies de-
pends on the network properties, the dynamical update
rule, the exact entries of the payoff matrix, the size of
the system and the time structure [15–21]. The theoret-
ical discussion was finally settled by several experiments
[22–26], which established that networks did not exhibit
a cooperation level significantly higher than a well mixed
population. Interestingly, those experimental works al-
low to conclude that most of the update rules that have
been used in analytical or numerical studies of the evolu-
tionary PD are not used by actual people when playing
the game, and therefore other dynamics must be consid-
ered.
In this paper, we propose an evolutionary update rule
that combines strategic thinking with imitation of a more
social character, and study how it affects the outcome of
the networked PD. Indeed, it has been noticed that in
the real world a key point is that people do not reach a
2decision only on the basis of a strategic reasoning, but
also considering the social pressure of their environment,
with the possibility of making mistakes [27, 28]. The
first and most common way for an individual to follow
social pressure is imitating a neighbor’s act or opinion
without any strategic considerations behind. To repre-
sent this, in a previous work [29] we introduced a model
where agents can evolve by a mixed dynamics of pure and
strategic imitation in a coordination game, finding that
such mixing makes possible that the system orders in one
of the two absorbing states in situations in which neither
the pure coordination game nor the voter model reach
consensus. Our aim here is to broaden the topic study-
ing what happens when pure imitation acts together with
strategic dynamics on the PD, verifying if also in this case
the non-strategic behavior leads to a more convenient fi-
nal configuration for the whole society. In addition, we
will compare our results to the available experimental
evidence, drawing conclusions as to the relevance of the
proposed dynamics to the real world.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II, we present
in detail our model and the rationale behind its defini-
tion. Section III deals then with the numerical results
obtained in two relevant systems, namely random (Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi, ER) and scale free (SF) networks. Subsequently,
in Sec. IV, it is analyzed how the system outcome changes
when other update dynamics are used in the strategic
decisions. Section V discusses our work on the light of
the experiments and finally Sec. VI summarizes our main
findings.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Our model consists of a system of N agents on a net-
work, which for the purpose of this work will be either
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi or random SF (generated with the config-
urational model) as paradigmatic examples to explore
the effects of heterogeneity in the number of connections.
Additionally, experiments on the behavior of human sub-
jects have been carried out on the same type of inhomo-
geneous networks [25], which facilitates the comparison
between our results and the experimental ones. Each
agent interacts directly only with her nearest neighbors in
the network, and can choose among two possible actions,
represented by a two-valued integer variable (“action”)
s = ±1. We identify the positive value with cooperation
(C) and the negative one with defection (D). Individu-
als interact in a PD, i.e., they play with their neighbors
and then collect a payoff according to the action adopted
by themselves and their opponents. Payoffs are collected
according to the following payoff matrix:
C D
C 1 0
D T ε
(1)
where the punishment parameter ε must fall in the in-
terval [0, 1) and T > 1 to ensure that the game is a PD.
Without loss of generality, we set T = 1.4 and vary ε in
our simulations. Note that this is not the usual way to
work with the PD in most papers, as typically ε is set
to 0 and the payoff to C vs D is in a range of zero or
negative values. The reason for this particular choice is
to facilitate the interpretation of our results on the light
of earlier work of ours on symmetric coordination games
[29], given by the same payoff matrix as in Eq. (1) with
T = 0 and ǫ = 1. In the game considered here, it is
well known that the rational choice is always to defect,
not only to prevent betrayals by other players but also
because it always gives higher payoff no matter what the
other player does (in economic terms, it is a Nash equi-
librium [4]). However, it is also clear that the global gain
would be higher if both agents cooperate, and just in here
lays the dilemma.
Having defined our strategic context, we now turn to
the dynamics. After every interaction, an individual up-
dates her strategy simply imitating a neighbor at ran-
dom, that is, following the voter model (VM) dynamics
with probability q. Otherwise, with probability 1− q, an
update rule based on the actual fitness attained by her-
self and her neighbors is implemented. For the main part
of the paper, we will use unconditional imitation (UI) as
the strategic update rule. With UI, at the end of each
round of the game, every player imitates the strategy of
the neighbor that has obtained the best payoff provided
it is larger than her own. This update rule was intro-
duced in [12] as a simple way to implement the interest
of a (rational) agent to maximize her own fitness and
to reach that end by imitating the most successful in-
dividuals. It is important to note that there are other
strategic imitation rules that could be considered, some
of which are discussed in Sec. IV below as alternatives
to our main model. Experimental results, however, show
that UI might resemble the actions of the players in real
life, provided they do not stick to the update rule all the
time [24, 26]. This is a further motivation to consider a
mixed dynamics as we are proposing here. On the other
hand, regarding the VM, in spite of its simplicity it has
been shown to capture some features of the way people
behave in, e.g., electoral processes [31] and therefore it is
a very suitable manner to introduce mechanisms of social
imitation in an otherwise strategic problem.
For reference, it is useful to recall what are the effects
of either of our dynamics when acting alone. In high
dimensional lattices (d ≥ 3) and random networks, the
VM dynamics drives the system to a disordered active
state, whose proportion of opinions (in our case, actions)
is given by the initial conditions [1, 30]. This state is dy-
namic in the ensemble average, the opinion of the agents
keep changing along time. In finite systems, the fluc-
tuations will eventually drive the system to consensus,
which is an absorbing state. The characteristic time to
reach consensus grows with system size N , diverging in
the limit N → ∞. As for the strategic dynamics, while
in mean field PD ends up in a consensus (frozen) state
with all defectors regardless of the update rule, in com-
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FIG. 1. Final active bonds density (top) and cooperator den-
sity (bottom) as a function of the dynamics mixing parame-
ter q and the punishment ε for a system on an ER random
network of size N = 3000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 8.48.
Caveat: the interval of parameter space investigated is (ε, q) ∈
[0, 0.5]× (0, 1), notice that q = 0 and q = 1 are excluded.
plex topologies it is possible that some cooperators sur-
vive, even though this effect is not universal and the fi-
nal state depends sensitively on an entire set of different
parameters. A full summary of the different outcomes
can be found in the review [14]. For our basic rule, UI,
the outcome of the evolution on random networks is in
general also full defection, but in a small parameter re-
gion around ε = 0 cooperation prevails, the more so the
lower the degree of the network. Such promotion of co-
operation in a bounded range of parameters takes place
as well for scale free networks, although in this case the
cooperative region is smaller than for random networks.
Note, however, that (whether ordered or disordered) the
final outcome of the system on the random networks with
strategic rules is in general a frozen state, where no player
changes her decision anymore. Finally, it is also inter-
esting to mention what happens when the interaction is
given by a coordination game [29]. In this case, as ex-
plained, the final outcome of either rule (VM or UI) alone
is a disordered state active or frozen but the mix of both
UI and VM completely changes the scenario because the
system tends to consensus either rapidly when the VM
is dominant or slowly when it acts as a noise over the
game-like evolution.
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FIG. 2. Final active bonds density (top) and cooperator den-
sity (bottom) as a function of the mixing parameter q and
ε for a system on networks of size N = 3000. The network
is an ER on the left and scale free on the right with average
degree 〈k〉 = 5.14. Caveat: the interval of parameter space
investigated is (ε, q) ∈ [0, 0.5] × (0, 1), notice that q = 0 and
q = 1 are excluded.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We begin the report of our numerical results by check-
ing whether the mixing of the two dynamics influences
how the system reaches the final state, and the nature
of the final state itself. Unless otherwise stated, we will
be presenting results averaged over 1000 system realiza-
tions. Figure 1 summarizes our results for an ER random
network with 〈k〉 = 8.48. In the top plot, the final value
of the active link density is shown as a function of the
punishment and of the mixing parameter. The active link
density is the fraction of links connecting nodes with op-
posite strategies. In the case of VM dynamics, these links
are susceptible of further updates. As can be seen in the
bottom panel, for a majority of parameter choices the
system becomes frozen in a consensus state (either all C
or D). Nevertheless, there exists a parameter region in
which the fate of the system is not frozen but a dynamic
state. As mentioned above, this is not the case when the
game is of coordination, and therefore it is a new phe-
nomenon arising for the PD. This region corresponds to
low values of ε, meaning that the incentive to defect is rel-
atively small, and high values of q, i.e., large probability
of imitating a neighbor at random (VM). Therefore, the
dynamics is such that as the transition from cooperator
to defector is relatively slow due to the strategic update
there remains a pool of cooperators than can be socially
copied and thus an overall intermediate level of cooper-
ation is maintained. In the regions where full consensus
is reached, the cooperator density in the plot is actually
the probability that the final configuration of a realiza-
tion is a full C state. An interesting feature demonstrated
by these plots is that cooperation is enhanced with re-
spect to the classical mean-field case and, although the
comparison is not straightforward due to the different pa-
rameterization, it is also enhanced when compared with
pure UI dynamics on a random network.
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FIG. 3. Time evolution of the average active links for a system
on networks of size N = 3000; a random network on the
left and a scale free network on the right, both with 〈k〉 =
5.14. Top figures are with low value of ε (0.5 in both cases);
bottom ones are with higher punishment parameter (0.3 and
0.4, respectively).
As these results are obtained for a specific type of net-
works, it is important to check their generality if the
average degree or the full network topology is changed.
For comparison, Figure 2 presents the final value of the
active link density and the cooperator density for an ER
random network and for a scale free network of average
degree 〈k〉 = 5.14 . It can be seen that decreasing the
number of neighbors leads to an expansion of the region
where cooperation is observed, in agreement with what
takes place with UI dynamics only; as the number of
neighbors decreases it becomes more likely to imitate a
cooperator and the network may be driven towards full
cooperation. On the contrary, the case of the scale free
network behaves differently: adding more heterogeneity
to the network leads to a slightly larger region of cooper-
ative behavior and, at the same time, to a smaller region
where the dynamics leads to an active state. Notwith-
standing, the general conclusion one can draw from these
plots is that the network properties, at least in the class
of uncorrelated networks we are looking at, do not affect
very much the outcome of the mixed dynamics.
Let us focus now on the details of the time evolution
of the system. Figure 3 shows examples of the behavior
of the average active links density in a system evolving
on a random or on a scale free network for different val-
ues of the punishment ε. For larger values of the punish-
ment, we find that the system always reaches a consensus
state, following an exponential decay for high values of q,
and a power-law-like decay for small values of the mix-
ing parameter. This behavior is qualitatively the same
in both types of networks, and it is in good agreement
with the results of the model studied in [29], where play-
ers interacted through a coordination game. When the
punishment is small, for small q the system still reaches
a consensus state. However for higher q it ends up in a
dynamic state. It is interesting to stress that for the q
values chosen in the case of the scale free network conver-
gence to consensus or an active mixed state is in fact a
reentrant phenomenon, as was expected from the results
in Figure 2. The fact that the system reaches a real active
final state is proven in Figure 4, where the time needed
to reach consensus, τ , is shown to diverge exponentially
with the system size. In the thermodynamic limit, the
system never orders.
To gain further insight on the properties of the final
state, we check whether cooperation is promoted or not
by the influence of the VM dynamics. The final coop-
erator density is shown in Figure 5 as a function of q
for ε = 0.05. The aim is to provide a clearer picture
than the general phase diagrams (ε, q) discussed above.
Even though in absence of any other model contribution
(q = 0) the cooperation is already promoted (as com-
pared to mean field) due to topological effects [14], we
can notice how initially the mixing of dynamics actually
enhances cooperation compared with the case of pure PD
game. Subsequently, upon increasing q, the final cooper-
ator density begins its decay towards zero (not shown),
apart from the singular limit at q = 1 where, as already
stated, only the voter dynamics is acting and the system
remains in an active disordered state (more precisely, the
limit of n∞c for q → 1
− is zero, but an infinite time is
needed to reach it). Once again, the behavior is similar
on the two types of networks studied. This is reminiscent
of the promotion of cooperation due to random noise (or
mutation) analyzed in [32]. However, the two models are
different because in the case of [32] noise acted upon any
network node, through a random change in the current
action of the player. On the contrary, what we have here
is interfacial noise, because it only acts through imitation
of neighbors who are playing a different action. There-
fore, the noise introduced by the VM does not act on
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FIG. 4. Dependence of the time needed to reach the final
state τ as a function of the system size N . Operatively, τ
has been measured as the time when the active link density
dropped below 0.07. The networks have a random (left) or
scale free (right) topology with average degree 〈k〉 = 5.14.
The punishment has been set at ε = 0.05 and q = 0.5 and
0.7, respectively. In the exponential fits τ ∼ exp(γN), we
have estimated γ ≃ 0.0032± 0.0008 for the random networks
and γ ≃ 0.0038 ± 0.0001 for the scale free networks.
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FIG. 5. Final cooperator density for a system on a random
(left) or scale free (right) network of size N = 3000 and aver-
age degree 〈k〉 = 5.14. The punishment parameter is ε = 0.05.
q = 0 means a purely strategy update of the PD, note that
there is a slight increase of n∞
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as soon as q becomes larger
than zero.
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FIG. 6. Time evolution of average active links for a system on
a random network of size N = 3000 and average degree 〈k〉 =
8.48 with punishment ε = 0.1 (top) and ε = 0.4 (bottom).
Left: REP update rule. Right: MOR update rule.
players who are completely surrounded by others with
their same action. Notwithstanding, we do observe that
an appropriate amount of VM leads to an increase of the
cooperation.
IV. OTHER UPDATE RULES
To complete our study and enlarge the understanding
of the combined effects of social imitation and strategic
dynamics, we will now consider two additional dynam-
ics, namely, replicator (REP) and Moran (MOR) rules.
With REP agents choose a neighbor at random: if the
payoff of the chosen neighbor is lower than the agent’s
own, nothing changes, but if it is larger, the agent will
adopt the neighbor’s strategy with a probability propor-
tional to the difference between the two payoffs. On the
other hand, with MOR, agents choose one of their neigh-
bors with probability proportional to their payoff, with-
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FIG. 7. Final cooperator density as a function of q and ε
for a system on a random (left) or scale free (right) network
of size N = 3000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 8.48 and 〈k〉 =
5.14, respectively. Top: REP update rule. Bottom: MOR
rule. Caveat: the interval of parameter space investigated
is (ε, q) ∈ [0, 0.5] × (0, 1), notice that q = 0 and q = 1 are
excluded.
out considering whether it is larger than hers or not. We
chose these two rules because they complement our study
of UI: indeed, UI is a local deterministic rule (an agent
watches all her neighborhood and the evolution is com-
pletely predetermined by the rule), REP is pairwise and
stochastic (an agent decides how to evolve watching only
one neighbor per time, and the result of the evolution is
not univocally determined), MOR is local and stochas-
tic. Moreover, MOR allows the individuals to make mis-
takes (there is a non-zero probability to imitate a neigh-
bor with worse fitness). In fact, MOR can be understood
as a weighted social imitation, where the weight is the
success of the individual observed. We stress, however,
that these two rules have not been observed in experi-
ments and therefore their interest here arises from the
viewpoint of the understanding of the mechanisms of the
mixed dynamics.
The first important difference when the update rule
changes is the disappearance of the final active state for
any value of the parameters. In all the (ε, q) phase space,
the behavior is always as in the examples depicted in
Figure 6: the active link density vanishes and a final
consensus is reached, with all the network choosing the
same action (either C or D). Moreover, the decay is in
all cases exponential, pointing to the power-law behavior
observed with UI as a specificity of that algorithm. In
practice, what we find is that the stochasticity of the
strategic evolution algorithm speeds up the dynamics and
helps the system reaches always final consensus, whereas
the pairwise or local character of the rule is less relevant.
As with the UI strategic dynamics, the type of net-
work considered (within the broad class of uncorrelated
networks of high dimensionality) is not relevant, in par-
ticular with regard to the final configuration. MOR rule
enhances cooperation with respect to REP, as shown in
Figure 7, and this increase is always somewhat larger
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FIG. 8. Final cooperator density for a system on a random
network of size N = 3000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 8.48. The
punishment parameter is ε = 0.10. Left: REP update rule.
Right: MOR rule. Note that since the final configuration is
static n∞
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corresponds to the fraction of realizations ending
in full cooperation.
in scale free networks. It can be noticed that while for
REP the final cooperator density drops rapidly with in-
creasing q, for agents evolving with the Moran rule the
final cooperator density falls more slowly and in a longer
range of q values (Fig. 8). In practice, while with MOR
rule inserting non-strategic imitation slightly enhances
(or at least does not hinder) cooperation just as with
UI, when we have REP the voter dynamics appears to
hamper the spreading of the cooperative strategy. As in-
dicated above, MOR can be seen as a generalized voter,
and the result is that the dynamics is similar in the sense
that it leads with similar probability to any of the two
possible outcomes. The final system aftermath is slightly
biased towards the equilibrium, but, interestingly, always
in a frozen configuration, which does not occur with VM
alone. Finally, it is clear that in both cases there is only
a weak dependence on ε.
V. DISCUSSION
This far, we have studied the combination of strategic
and social imitation dynamics as driver for evolution in a
networked PD. We have thus learned that when strategic
updates obey the UI rule, the mixing of dynamics helps
the system to reach consensus in an all C or D config-
uration. Note that for certain values of the parameters
the final state is full cooperation, which is not an equi-
librium of the underlying game. Furthermore, there is a
small parameter region (high q and low ε) where the final
fate of the system is a dynamic state with a fraction of
cooperators and defectors.
In view of these results, a first question arises as
whether some analytical explanation of those observa-
tions is possible. Unfortunately, the approach used for
this purpose in [29] does not work here due to the strongly
different nature of the two games: VM and PD do not
have the same equilibria as VM and the coordination
game. Indeed, the outcome of the evolution for the co-
ordination game is always a Nash equilibrium, and when
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FIG. 9. Evidence for moody conditional cooperation on sys-
tems given by a random network (left) and a scale free network
(right) of size N = 3000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 5.14. Top:
frequency of cooperation after defection as a function of the
fraction of cooperating neighbors (see text) in the previous
round. Bottom: frequency of cooperation after cooperation
as a function of the fraction of cooperating neighbors in the
previous round. Note that the histograms are similar regard-
less of the network topology. The payoff matrix is the same
as in [24] for comparison, with ε = 0, T = 1.4, and the payoff
to a cooperator facing a defector vanishing as well; UI update
rule.
the PD converges to full cooperation, it is not. There
is, however, a possibility to address the issue in a lim-
ited parameter regime by considering a random walk in
a weighted directed network. It is known that the conver-
gence time of the voter model has the same distribution
as the convergence time of the coalescing random walk
process to a single particle [33–35], which in its turn is
related to the mean first passage time (MFPT) of a single
walker [36]. Then, for q = 1 (i.e., pure VM dynamics)
our problem is exactly that of the random walk on com-
plex networks. On the other hand, for q < 1, because of
the evolutionary rules, the agents with higher fitness can
be seen as nodes where the probability of a walker to fall
into increases and, at the same time, it becomes more
difficult to escape from them. Now, for an undirected
network, the MFPT from whatever starting point to an
arrival node j, τuj , is [36, 37]
τuj =
D
∑
l Alj
, (2)
where Alj is the adjacency matrix, which includes the
weight of each link, and D is an appropriate constant.
Considering a situation with a mixing parameter q close
to one, let us say, q = 1 − η with η small enough, the
MFPT can be approximated by
τj = τ
u
j + αj(η), (3)
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FIG. 10. Time evolution of the fractions of cooperators and
active links on a scale free network of size N = 3000 and
average degree 〈k〉 = 5.14. The payoff matrix is the same as
in [24] for comparison, with ε = 0, T = 1.4, and the payoff
to a cooperator facing a defector vanishing as well; UI update
rule.
where αj should be a suitable perturbation depending
on η and on the node j. Then, if j is occupied by an
individual with the best fitness of all her neighborhood
and having in mind that the strategic evolution is UI, no
walker will ever reach node j, i.e. αj → ∞, then also
τj diverges. For the other rules we have checked, with
MOR rule αj always remains finite, whereas with REP
rule the system behaves in principle like UI, but since
it hinders considerably cooperation after relatively few
time steps, it is easy for the finite system to undergo a
fluctuation (due to the voter dynamics) which let it land
at the all-defectors consensus. Of course, such argument
is only qualitative and does not fully explain what goes
on to the dynamics for every value of q close to 1, but
at least provides some justification of our observations
under an UI update rule.
Beyond finding analytical insights on our results, the
other important question that requires discussion is the
relation of this dynamics with experiments. The experi-
ments on square lattices [24, 26] or on heterogeneous net-
works [25] show that subjects behave in a way that has
been called moody conditional cooperation (MCC). This
means that the action they take depends on the number
of cooperating neighbors they had in the previous round:
the more neighbors cooperated, the more likely it is that
the player cooperates. However, the choice depends also
on the player’s own previous action: thus, it has been
shown that cooperation following cooperation is much
more likely than following defection. We have therefore
checked whether the dynamics of our simulations is com-
patible with this observation. To this end, we looked at
the probability of cooperation of an agent as a function
of her last action and depending on the fraction of coop-
erating neighbors the last time she was selected to play
a round. Also, in order to get better statistics and com-
pare the results, we consider three ranges of cooperation
contexts: when less than one third of the neighbors co-
operated, when more than two third cooperated, and the
intermediate case. We then estimate the probabilities of
cooperation by looking at the frequencies with which the
corresponding actions are chosen.
Our results are shown in Figure 9, where it can be seen
that we indeed observe a behavior of the agents reminis-
cent of the experimental observations. Indeed, we see
that after defecting the probability to cooperate in the
next round is low and not very dependent on the context,
while after cooperating there is an almost linear depen-
dence of the probability to cooperate again on the num-
ber of neighboring cooperators, as reported in the exper-
iments [24–26]. Moreover, again in accordance with ex-
periments, there is no dependence on the topology. The
simulation has been done with a value of q = 0.3, which
we have chosen seeing that in the experimental data, if
there is any imitation of the best neighbor, it happens
at most in around 70% of the cases. However, it is im-
portant to stress that these measurements are carried
out during the transient phase: as we already stated, for
most of the parameter space the final state of the system
is either full cooperation or full defection, and in par-
ticular for payoff values similar to those used in the ex-
periments, the system converges to full cooperation (see
Fig. 10). This is not in agreement with the experimen-
tal observations, where, if there is indeed convergence
to a homogeneous state, it is very slow and much more
likely towards full defection. In previous works [29, 38],
we have observed a much slower dynamics for the coop-
eration fraction but associated to other type of games
or more involved opinion models. On the other hand,
we have checked that the same behavior arises for a very
wide range of values of q and ε, and hence in this sense the
relation between moody conditional cooperation and our
mixed dynamics is quite robust. In any event, we stress
that such mixing of dynamics is not a necessary condition
to get MCC behavior, but a sufficient one. Therefore,
while there are alternative explanations of the observed
behavior in terms of players’ learning [39], we believe
that the fact that the outcome of our simulations mix-
ing social and strategic imitation is not far, in behavioral
terms, from the experimental results, warrants further
research to clarify the explanatory power of this mecha-
nism or similar ones. In this respect, the observed lack
of qualitative dependence of the agents’ behavior on spe-
cific properties of a high dimensional network where the
game takes place, being another feature in which both
our simulations and experiments coincide, makes such a
study even more appealing.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have provided evidence that social im-
itation dynamics, added to strategic update rules driving
8the evolution of players’ actions in a PD, leads to consen-
sus. In addition, in an ample range of parameters, the
selected consensus is cooperative, even if it is not a Nash
equilibrium of the game. In this manner, social imita-
tion given by a VM-like dynamics, helps the individuals
of a complex society adopt the most convenient behavior
without being influenced by the risks involved in such a
choice, again, at least for not too large punishments. It is
important to realize that reaching cooperative outcomes
is a product of our mixed dynamics and of the existence
of a network, as in a well-mixed population the consen-
sus is always to full defection. The appearance of full
cooperation takes place when the punishment ε for mu-
tual defection is small, as in this case cooperation is not
an equilibrium but it is not very far from it, and in that
situation social imitation of defectors is not fast enough
to induce the other consensus. We also want to stress
that this is a general effect, not limited to the PD, as our
earlier study [29] on the totally symmetric coordination
game with unconditional imitation shows. Interestingly,
in contrast to what takes place in the coordination game,
for large q and small ε, the networked PD remains in a
disordered dynamic state stable in the large-size limit
and which, in turn, appears to be independent of the
topology, at least as far as the heterogeneity of the net-
work is concerned. Moreover, with UI update rule, as
in the coordination game we also observe the existence
of two regimes in the time evolution towards consensus:
power-law when q (the probability of social imitation) is
small, and then the main driver of the agents’ decision is
strategic, and exponential, when q → 1. In this last case,
the system behaves initially according to a pure voter
dynamics, reaching a state that is very close to the final
configuration of the voter model. Only after a charac-
teristic time t∗(q) that configuration is in turn affected
by the action of the strategic rule, ending up in a frozen
configuration, with the exception of the region mentioned
above. Naturally, such t∗(q) diverges for q approaching
to 1, where only the voter model regime is left. On the
other hand, with REP and MOR only an exponential
decay can be observed (Fig. 6), for every ε and q.
We have also extended our study to other strategic
dynamics, in order to assess the mechanisms behind our
observations. To that end, we have implemented REP,
which copies a neighboring agent’s action if it led to bet-
ter payoff than that of the focal agent, and MOR, which
copies a neighboring agent’s action with probability pro-
portional to her payoff, and can make mistakes choos-
ing less profitable actions. By comparing these update
rules with UI, given by imitation of the best-performing
neighbor, we conclude that only if the strategic imitation
takes into account the whole neighborhood the payoff-
increasing cooperation can arise with some generality.
Indeed, with the REP rule consensus to cooperation is
the outcome in at most 15% of the realizations, where
the asymptotics of MOR is almost random (somewhat
biased towards defection) as it is a combination of two
bounded rationality imitation rules. Another particular
result of UI dynamics is the regime in which the system
remains in active state, as with the other two dynamics
the final outcome is always full consensus and a frozen
configuration.
It is worth recalling that other researchers have already
dealt with models of PD whose dynamics change by tun-
ing a parameter. For example, in [40] the behavior of
the game on different topologies is studied as a function
of selection pressure, from neutral evolution to pure im-
itation, while in [41] the robustness of the outcomes of
weak selection dynamics in well-mixed populations is an-
alyzed when selection becomes intermediate or strong.
There are interesting transitions also in these cases, but
we must stress that our study is deeply different: indeed,
here the varying parameter is the weight of the VM dy-
namics, which cannot be considered as a simple noise,
since it produces correlations in the system [29]. More-
over, at variance with reference [41], it acts on interfaces,
that is, it can work only between agents of opposite opin-
ion.
To conclude in a more general tone, we have found that
the mechanism of combined social and strategic imita-
tion is a very powerful one to drive the system towards
full consensus, even if the so reached frozen configura-
tion is not an equilibrium of the game as we have seen
in this paper. We note that such mechanism does not
necessarily lead to desirable states such as cooperation
in a networked PD: this is only observed under suitable
parameters (in particular, a not too stringent dilemma)
and with a “greedy” strategic rule such as UI. Other-
wise, social imitation leads in the case of the PD to less
cooperation than pure strategic behavior. We have also
noted that social imitation is not a mutation-type noise,
but rather it behaves as interfacial noise as it only acts
on active links, where a cooperator and a defector are
connected. As such noise, it also leads to enhanced co-
operation as compared to pure UI on networks. Finally,
we have seen that there a number of features of the ex-
perimental results on networked PDs that are recovered
from this model, and that a description of those results in
terms of transient configurations of our dynamics would
be possible. This suggests that our mechanism could pro-
vide the basis for alternative explanations of the behavior
of human subjects in experiments.
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